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2I. Introduction
A great debate has been brewing for years over whether 
unions should be able to organize employees outside of the 
traditional election procedures provided by the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”).1  Typically, in an 
organizing drive, a union solicits support from employees to 
indicate a desire to run a National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “Board”) election.2 The union does this by collecting
cards from employees affirming the employees’ desire to have a 
representation election.3  If the union collects valid cards from 
at least one-third of eligible employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit,4 the union may then petition for a Board 
election.5  If the majority of employees support the union in the 
election, then the employer must recognize the union and bargain 
in good faith with the union for an initial labor contract.6
During the period between the representation election and the 
completion of the first collective bargaining agreement, the 
NLRA bars the employer, the employees, and competing labor 
unions from challenging the representative union’s majority 
status for a reasonable period of time.7
Board elections have long been the preferred method of 
obtaining union recognition.8 Recently, however, many unions have 
begun focusing on another organizing strategy known as card 
check recognition.9 In card check recognition campaigns, a union 
3demonstrates majority support of the employees in a bargaining 
unit by collecting cards from a majority of employees that 
express the employees’ desire to have the union represent them 
and gaining the consent of the employer to recognize the union 
as the representative of the employees without the formality of 
a Board election.10  Unions generally negotiate neutrality 
agreements with employers prior to launching a card check 
campaign to ensure the employer will not oppose the union during 
the organizing drive.11 If the employer refuses to recognize the 
union, then the union may petition the Board for an election.12
Though the NLRB and courts prefer Board elections,13 unions
generally prefer card check campaigns because they are vastly 
more likely to result in a successful unionization drive than 
Board elections.14  However, anti-union groups criticize this 
approach as an unfair coercion of employees to join unions.15
In 2004, the NLRB granted review of several cases that 
called into question the underlying principles of card check 
recognition.  In Dana Corporation and Metaldyne, the Board,
reversing a Regional Director’s dismissal of the complaints,
decided to hear cases where the dispute concerned whether or not 
voluntary employer recognition of a union based on a card check
campaign should be given “election bar quality.”16 An election 
bar is the period of time during which a union’s right to 
represent the bargaining unit cannot be challenged by an
4employer, employees, or another union.17  The Board took the 
cases to determine whether unions certified as a result of a 
card check campaign should be granted the same amount of 
protection as unions certified through a Board election.  In 
Shaw’s Supermarkets, the Board reversed the Regional Director’s 
dismissal of a case where employees’ attempted to decertify the 
union, which the employer voluntarily recognized based on the 
union’s presentation of signed cards supporting unionization.18
Again, the Board’s decision to hear such a case indicated its 
willingness to consider treating union recognition based on card 
check as inferior to recognition based on Board elections.
While awaiting the Board’s verdict, a rich legislative 
debate over card check recognition has been renewed.  This year, 
Republicans and Democrats introduced opposing legislation 
specifically related to card check recognition.  Republicans 
introduced the Secret Ballot Protection Act19 (“SBPA”), which 
would make NLRB elections the exclusive method for union 
recognition, prohibiting employers from voluntarily recognizing 
a union based on a demonstration of majority support. Across 
the aisle, Democrats introduced the Employee Free Choice Act20
(“EFCA”), which would mandate that an employer recognize a union 
upon demonstration of majority support by submission of 
employee-signed union authorization cards to the NLRB.21
5This article argues: (1) that the NLRB should define the 
“reasonable period of time” for a certification bar following 
union recognition based on a card check campaign to be 
commensurate with election bar quality; (2) that the NLRB should 
not narrow the availability of card check recognition as an 
organizing tool in its resolution of Shaw’s Supermarkets; (3) 
that Congress should reject the Secret Ballot Protection Act’s 
effort to prohibit card check recognition campaigns; and 
finally, (4) that Congress should, perhaps with some minor 
amendments, pass the Employee Free Choice Act.  Section II of 
this article provides contextual background surrounding the 
issue of card check recognition.  Section III provides legal 
analysis of Dana Corporation and Shaw’s Supermarkets, including 
legal history supporting card-check recognition as a legitimate
organizing tool.  Section IV analyzes the legislative efforts to 
prohibit and to codify card check recognition.  
II. Background
The purpose behind the National Labor Relations Act was to 
ensure peaceful industrial relations between business and labor,
and to provide employees the right to choose whether or not to 
organize.22 When drafting the NLRA, Congress left open the 
opportunity for employers to recognize employees’ decision to 
organize through means outside of the context of NLRB supervised 
elections.23  Years later, when Congress made the last major 
6changes to the NLRA, legislators proposed amendments to make 
NLRB elections the only method to gain employer recognition of a 
union, and to explicitly prohibit the use of cards to gain 
recognition of majority status.24  Congress rejected these 
amendments in favor of maintaining the tradition of card check 
recognition.25
Over the course of the past several decades, union 
membership in the United States has been on the decline.26  This 
trend is attributable, in part, to a shift in the concentration 
of the United States economy from manufacturing to services.27
Additionally, increased global competition in manufacturing has 
put pressure on employers to resist union drives.28  This 
competition has also narrowed the union premium29 that employees 
in union shops enjoy.30 While encouraging anti-union campaigns 
and narrowing the gap in wages between union and non-union 
workers, the shift from manufacturing to services that global 
competition has caused has also resulted in smaller sized firms.  
Unions’ success rates in NLRB elections has remained constant 
throughout the past several decades,31 but the size of the firms 
that unions organize has decreased, resulting in unions 
organizing fewer employees per NLRB election.32 Changing 
demographics in the workplace are an additional factor affecting 
unionization rates.33
7Employment legislation may also have, in part, supplanted 
the perceived need for labor unions.  Employment legislation 
allows employees to “challenge unsafe working conditions, job 
discrimination, workplace harassment, and unjust dismissals.”34
Also, “federal deregulation and the 1948 Taft-Hartley right-to-
work provisions have transformed the organizational climate 
facing unions.”35
In the past fifteen years, organized labor has responded to 
the decline in union membership by focusing on new organizing 
tactics.36 Between 1998 and 2003, the AFL-CIO organized less 
than one-fifth of the nearly three million workers it added to 
its membership through NLRB elections.37
Adrienne E. Eaton and Jill Kriesky found a much higher 
success rate in organizing and in bargaining first contracts
with card check recognition than with NLRB elections.38 This 
study found that nearly 80 percent of the organizing drives 
featuring neutrality and card-check agreements were successful 
in gaining employer recognition, and that approximately 95
percent of those drives resulted in the negotiation of first 
contracts.39  In contrast, the study found that the success rate 
for unions in Board elections is markedly less, with win rates 
between 40 and  45 percent.40
Of the card check recognition campaigns studied, the 
overwhelming majority of them, 92.9 percent, featured agreements 
8between the union and the employer stipulating that the employer 
would remain neutral during the organizing drive.41  Neutrality 
stipulations generally require the employer to either remain 
neutral or, at least, to not actively oppose the union.42 In
some instances, the employer may communicate facts to the 
employees, but the spirit behind the agreement is that the 
employer will not attempt to dissuade employees from joining the 
union.43
In 73 percent of the agreements studied, labor and 
management included language stipulating that if the union 
collected signed cards of support from a majority of employees, 
the employer would recognize the union without going through a 
NLRB election.44 Nearly all of the organizing agreements 
included language providing for some form of dispute 
resolution.45
When comparing instances of alleged employer unfair labor 
practice violations, the study found significantly higher rates 
of violations where the agreement strictly stipulated 
neutrality, as opposed to both neutrality and card-check.46
Labor alleged violations in 90 percent of cases where labor and 
management contracted a neutrality agreement without a card-
check agreement.47  Where card-check was part of the agreement, 
the study found alleged violations in only 42.9 percent of the 
cases.48  Similarly, where the agreement stipulated neutrality 
9alone, the study found that the employer fired employees who 
supported the union in one third of the cases.  Meanwhile, only 
8.7 percent of the cases resulted in employee firings in 
situations where the agreement provided for card check.49
Nearly all organizing drives without a neutrality or card-
check agreement featured some form of alleged anti-union 
campaign.50  The presence of card-check agreements in organizing 
campaigns is a strong assurance to the union, and the union-
supporting employees, that management will not commit unfair 
labor practices.51
A study of unionization in British Columbia suggests that 
laws prohibiting card-check recognition have a negative impact 
on union organizing.52 The study analyzed the effect of British 
Columbia’s enactment of mandatory certification election laws on 
union organizing success rates.53  Prior to the mandatory 
certification election law, if a union demonstrated 55 percent
support through signed cards, the union gained recognition 
without an election.54 Following enactment of the mandatory 
certification election laws, union success rates in organizing 
drives fell by nearly 20 percent.55 Following the rollback of 
the mandatory election laws, union organizing success rates 
recovered to their pre-enforcement levels.56
While there is ample statistical evidence of the benefits 
of card check campaigns in terms of successfully organizing 
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workers, there is a notable absence of data supporting 
allegations of union coercion of employees during card check 
campaigns. During legislative hearings in the 108th Congress 
concerning the Secret Ballot Protection Act, two employees spoke 
against card check campaigns and in favor of the legislation.57
While some of their complaints may warrant concern, the 
complaints were anecdotal and often off-point.  Similarly, the 
leading non-profit organizations which oppose card check 
recognition use anecdotal stories to demonstrate the grounds for 
their criticism of card check without much in the way of 
statistical assertions that card check recognition 
systematically promotes union abuses of employees.58 Many of the 
concerns raised to a union’s approach to organizing employees 
through card check recognition are legitimate, particularly when
in the context of a union-employer neutrality agreement.  
However, Congress has equipped the NLRB with the tools necessary 
to handle situations when a union abuses its power by coercing 
employees to join.59
III. Legal Analysis
The Supreme Court long ago held that unions may gain 
recognition as the collective bargaining representative of an 
employee unit through means other than Board elections.60
However, the parameters of union recognition by means other than 
Board elections are not entirely clear.  This section presents 
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an overview of card check recognition’s evolution, and 
highlights areas where the Board has indicated it may narrow 
protection for unions that gained recognition through card check 
campaigns.
A. Card Check Recognition’s Foundation
Section seven of the National Labor Relations Act 
guarantees workers the right to choose whether or not to join a 
labor organization.61 Section eight of the Act prohibits both 
employers and labor unions from coercing employees in such a way 
as to violate employees’ right to freely choose whether to 
organize or not.62 Such interference with the right to organize 
by either side would constitute an unfair labor practice.63
Section nine of the Act states:
Representatives designated or selected for the 
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of 
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, 
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the 
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. . . .64
The Court has interpreted Congress’s failure to specify exactly 
how employees must choose a labor representative to mean that 
Congress never intended recognition through Board elections to 
be the only option.65 If section nine of the Act is read to 
permit recognition through card check campaigns, then it follows 
that section eight of the Act, mandating collective bargaining
with the labor representative chosen by a majority of employees, 
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requires an employer to bargain with a union approved by a 
majority of employees through card check recognition.66
Though the Supreme Court has read the NLRA to allow union 
recognition through card check campaigns, the Court has 
interpreted section nine of the Act to only allow recognition of 
labor unions outside of the scope of Board elections in two 
circumstances.67 In the first, the Board will recognize a union 
as the employee unit’s official representative through card 
check recognition when the employer voluntarily recognizes the 
union after the union demonstrates majority support through 
presentation of validly signed employee authorization cards.68
In the second, the Board will recognize the union where the 
Board held an election but discarded the results due to unfair 
labor practices by the employer.69
In Gissel, the Supreme Court held that NLRB elections were
not always necessary for employees to obtain majority status 
recognition,70 finding that authorization cards were an adequate 
measure of employee support for a labor union.71  However, the 
Court limited its holding to circumstances where “a fair 
election probably could not have been held, or where an election 
that was held was in fact set aside” due to a Board finding of 
unfair labor practices by the employer.72
In Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme 
Court clarified when an employer may disregard a demonstration 
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of majority status through a card check drive.73  The Court held 
that 
unless an employer has engaged in an unfair labor 
practice that impairs the electoral process, a union 
with authorization cards purporting to represent a 
majority of the employees, which is refused 
recognition, has the burden of taking the next step in 
invoking the Board’s election procedure.74
The Court found that while an employer’s avowed distrust 
may “mask his opposition to unions,” the employer may also have 
“rational, good-faith grounds for distrusting authorization 
cards in a given situation.”75  If the employer refuses to 
bargain with the union on the basis of the collection of a 
majority of signed cards, then the union has only two options:  
file for an election, or make a claim to the NLRB that the 
employer engaged in unfair labor practices as expressed in 
Gissel.76 In Linden Lumber, the Court did not decide whether an 
employer commits an unfair labor practice by demanding an 
official Board election when it breaches an agreement to 
recognize a union upon presentation of validly signed 
authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the 
unit.77
In Snow and Sons, the employer had agreed to recognize the 
union if employees produced signed cards from a majority of 
employees.78  Upon producing a majority of cards, the employer 
refused to recognize the union, instead insisting upon a Board 
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certified election.79  The NLRB found the employer refusal to be 
an unfair labor practice by the employer.80  As a remedy for the 
employer’s unfair labor practice, the Board ordered the employer 
to bargain collectively with the union as the official 
representative of the employee unit.81
Precedent clearly establishes that an employer may 
voluntarily recognize a union upon demonstration of majority 
support through employee signed authorization cards.82 It is 
less clear under what circumstances an employer may refuse 
recognition upon demonstration of majority status.  Gissel, 
Linden Lumber, and Snow and Sons established that when an 
employer has agreed to recognize a union upon presentation and 
verification of a majority of signed cards, refusal to recognize 
may constitute an unfair labor practice and warrant an NLRB 
bargaining order.83  The Board explained in Julian, Inc. that “a 
union can establish voluntary recognition by showing its express 
demand for, and an employer’s voluntary grant of, recognition to 
the union as bargaining representative based on a 
contemporaneous showing of union support among a majority of 
employees in an appropriate unit.”84
B. Dana Corporation and Metaldyne: Election Bar Quality?
The issue before the Board in Dana Corporation and 
Metaldyne is whether “the employer’s voluntary recognition of 
the union bars a decertification petition for a reasonable 
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period of time.”85 More particularly, should voluntary employer 
recognition of a union based on a card check campaign be given 
election “bar quality”?86  The Board seemed to resolve this issue 
in Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., where it held that, when an 
employer voluntarily recognizes a union subsequent to a 
demonstration of majority support, “like situations involving 
certifications, Board orders, and settlement agreements, the 
parties must be afforded a reasonable time to bargain and to 
execute the contracts resulting from such bargaining.”87
However, the Board has recently demonstrated a willingness to 
revisit the issue of election bar quality in instances where a 
union gained recognition through a card check campaign.
The employers in both Dana Corporation and Metaldyne
recognized the union after the union presented cards signed by a 
majority of employees and checked by a neutral third party for 
validity.88 Soon after recognition, employees at each company 
challenged the union’s certification.  If voluntary recognition 
is given bar quality, then employees would not be able to 
challenge the union as their labor representative for a 
reasonable period of time after initial recognition.  The 
Board’s majority raised two factors that distinguish these cases 
from precedent, justifying its decision to reverse the Regional 
Directors’ dismissal of each case.89  First, in each of these 
cases, the employers agreed to recognize the unions via a 
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neutrality and card check agreement prior to the unions’ 
organizing drives.90  Second, the Board indicated that changing 
conditions in the labor relations environment warranted 
heightened scrutiny of card check doctrine.91 These two factors, 
the majority concluded, warrant consideration of whether the 
union’s recognition should enjoy election bar quality.92 The 
Board will likely review the Keller Plastics doctrine, deciding 
whether “a reasonable period of time” in instances where the 
employer voluntarily recognizes a union in the context of a card 
check campaign should be shorter than instances where 
recognition was based on a NLRB election.93
In NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., after employer 
recognition of majority status, a majority of employees signed a 
decertification petition.94  Affirming the Board’s decision, the 
Court held recognition barred a decertification petition despite 
the fact that the employer based recognition on card check 
rather than an election.95  The Court explained:
Ward argues that it should not be required to bargain 
with the Union because the Union was recognized on the 
basis of a card check rather than an election, and it 
is unfair to bind employees for a lengthy period on 
the basis of such an informal and uncertain method of 
selection. Sec. 9 authorizes both methods of 
selection, and we see no reason to set aside the 
Board's decision to ignore this distinction in this 
case.  Both employers and employees have adequate 
methods of challenging the existence of majority 
support for a union at the time it was recognized by 
an employer on the basis of a card check. 96
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But the Court gave much deference to the Board when reaching its 
decision, stating, “[w]e believe that in this situation the 
Board should be left free to utilize its administrative 
expertise in striking the proper balance.”97 The Court’s 
deference in Montgomery Ward to the Board and the fact that it 
did not address whether a reasonable period of time for a 
certification bar could differ in the case of card check as 
compared to Board elections implies that the Board in Dana 
Corporation and Metaldyne will have substantial leverage with 
which to define a reasonable period of time.98
In NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., the Court, 
acknowledging that the Board “has not fixed any period of 
mandated collective bargaining where uncertified unions are 
involved,”99 emphasized that a demonstration of a loss of 
majority status does not preclude the reasonable period of time 
requirement, even in card check recognition cases.100 Cayuga
held that Brooks v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.101 “compel[s] the 
conclusion that the Unions’ status must be recognized for a 
reasonable period despite the loss of majority employee 
support.”102  Therefore, while the Board will have much leverage 
to determine a “reasonable period of time” for certification 
bars in card check recognition cases, the Board will not be able 
to eliminate the certification bar all together.103
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In Brooks, the Court explained that the NLRA provides 
employees with the opportunity to petition the Board for a 
decertification election104 and that an employer similarly may 
petition the Board for such an election.105  Further, under the 
NLRA, after either a certification or decertification election, 
the Board could not hold another election for a period of one 
year.106  This rule clearly applied to a union certified by a 
Board election,107 but the court indicated that “an employer 
would presumably still be under a duty to bargain with an 
uncertified union that had a clear majority.”108 In terms of 
defining what a reasonable period of time should be, the Court 
observed that the Board established that one year after 
certification the employer can ask for an election.109  Most 
importantly, the Court stated that this determination was “a 
matter appropriately determined by the Board's administrative 
authority.”110
The Board may succeed in limiting the definition of a 
reasonable period of time for a certification bar in the context 
of union recognition based on card check.  Keller Plastics
stands for the Board’s traditional approach that card check 
recognition creates a certification bar for a reasonable period 
of time.111  But Keller Plastics did not address the issue of 
whether a reasonable period of time for a certification bar 
where recognition was based on card check should be commensurate 
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with the period of time provided where recognition was based on 
a Board election.112  However, that the Board may succeed in such 
endeavor does not mean that it should do so.  Providing a 
shorter period of time for the election bar where recognition 
resulted from a card check campaign puts a stamp of illegitimacy 
on the union’s efforts.  This undermines the intent of the Act 
to afford recognition to a union where a majority of employees 
express a desire for the union to represent them.113  Since the 
legitimacy of card check recognition under the NLRA is well-
established, the Board should afford unions that win recognition 
through card check the same protection as unions that win 
recognition through Board elections.  
C. Shaw’s Supermarkets
Shaw’s Supermarkets involves the interpretation of a 
contractual agreement between the Shaw’s Supermarkets and the 
United Food and Commercial Workers Union.114  The Board raised 
two issues when reversing the Regional Directors dismissal of 
the case: first, whether Shaw’s waived its right contractually 
to a Board election; and second, whether “public policy reasons 
outweigh the Employer’s private agreement not to have an 
election.”115  Here, the Board’s intent to scrutinize and narrow 
the availability of traditional protections for unions 
recognized through card check seems more apparent.
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The Board questioned whether Shaw’s actually waived its 
rights to a Board election.116  The Board recognized that the 
contract states the employer will recognize the union upon a 
demonstration of majority status, but the contract does not 
explicitly state that the union may demonstrate majority status 
by the collection of signed cards.117 Beyond not explicitly 
acknowledging card check, the Board argued that even if the 
parties intended for cards to be a legitimate medium for 
demonstrating majority status, the contract does not preclude 
other methods as well – including Board elections.118  The 
majority does not explain why the parties would bother to 
contract for the employer to recognize the union upon a showing 
of majority status based on a Board election since the employer 
would be bound by the NLRA to recognize the union in such a 
situation anyway.119  Implicitly, the majority status clause 
should imply a contractual obligation of the employer to 
recognize the union based on non-Board election demonstration of 
majority support, including demonstration through validly signed 
cards.120
In addition to doubting whether the terms of the contract 
in Shaw’s Supermarkets demonstrate intent by the parties to 
afford recognition based on a card check campaign, the Board 
suggested that such an agreement may not constitute a legitimate 
contract.121 As a contractual matter, the Board claimed, “there 
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is a serious question of mutuality and consideration.”122 The 
Dissent disagreed, citing Retail Clerks for the proposition that 
a union can offer consideration through waiver of its right to a 
Board election.123 In Retail Clerks, the Court stressed that the 
NLRB must not interpret a contract clause “to render the 
contract promise illusory or meaningless.”124 The majority 
appears to be stabbing at contractual issues inherent to card 
check recognition agreements to fundamentally undermine the 
organizing approach.
The Board’s most poignant reasoning justifying the reversal 
of the Regional Director’s dismissal of the case was its 
suggestion that the determination of whether the union used 
coercion when collecting cards from employees should be the 
responsibility of the Board, not of a third party arbitrator.125
Though deference is generally given to the arbitration process 
in labor disputes,126 reviewing claims of unfair labor practices 
is certainly within the purview of the Board.127 If the Board 
believes, on the basis of the complaint, that an arbitrator 
failed to handle claims of union coercion in a card check 
campaign, then Board review is appropriate.128 Indeed, the 
strongest argument that opponents of card check recognition put 
forward is that the process breeds union coercion of 
employees.129 However, that the Board may review claims of 
unfair labor practices in card check campaigns is further proof 
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that card check recognition does not jeopardize the rights of 
employees by subjecting them to union coercion.130  Where unions 
coerce employees to sign cards, employees and employers have a 
legitimate and accessible venue to hold unions accountable for 
their abuses.
The contractual issues that the majority raised in Shaw’s 
Supermarkets seem to be a smokescreen for their intent to 
fundamentally change public policy concerning card check 
campaigns.  The majority plainly stated, “[w]e have some policy 
concerns as to whether an employer can waive the employees’
fundamental right to vote in a board election.”131  The majority 
continued, 
[w]e recognize that, under current law, an employer 
can voluntarily recognize a union based on a card-
majority, and that such recognition can operate to 
preclude employee resort to election machinery for a 
reasonable period of time. However, in Dana 
Corporation and Metaldyne Corporation, we have granted 
review to consider inter alia, that issue. We can do 
no less here.132
Clearly, the majority does not intend to do less here.  In 
Shaw’s Supermarkets, the Board’s majority appears intent on 
expanding the inquiry into whether or not card check is a 
legitimate organizing tool.133  The Board narrowly reads the
employees’ fundamental right to choose whether or not to “select 
or designate” a union to represent them as their collective 
bargaining representative to mean that employees should choose 
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whether to organize exclusively through Board elections.134 This 
issue has been resolved, as the Board concedes, in favor of 
allowing, not only Board elections, but alternatives to Board 
elections.135  As the statistics demonstrate, employees face 
fewer obstacles to organizing when alternatives to Board 
elections are available.136
The Bush-appointed NLRB majority may try to achieve through 
the Board what Republicans are attempting to do through the 
legislature – eliminate card check recognition as a viable 
organizing tool.  However, this is a clear case of judicial 
activism whether the Board itself recognizes that the law, 
established by statute and interpreted consistently by the 
Supreme Court, provides protection for unions recognized through 
card check campaigns. The NLRB should not act in the capacity 
of the legislative branch by rewriting policy.  The Board should 
leave the task of drastically changing public policy to the 
legislature.  
IV. The Legislative Battle
Two issues should permeate the legislative discussion 
concerning card check recognition: first, is union coercion of 
employees rampant in the card check process; and second, is the 
NLRB ill-equipped to handle such coercion.  A survey of NLRB 
decisions demonstrates that coercion is not rampant, and that 
the NLRB is well equipped to determine whether unions used 
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coercion in the process of convincing employees to sign 
recognition cards and to provide a remedy in instances where 
such coercion occurred.  This section explores these issues 
through a discussion of opposing legislative proposals designed 
to amend the NLRA with regards to card check recognition.
A. The Secret Ballot Protection Act
The legislative battle over card check recognition is 
largely a battle to either defend or put an end to unionism in 
the United States. United States Representative Charles Norwood 
(Republican, Georgia) launched the campaign to support the 
Secret Ballot Protection Act (SBPA) in February 2005.137
Writing in the Washington Times, Representative Norwood 
lambasted labor unions for organizing workers via union card-
signing campaigns instead of through the more traditional method 
of NLRB elections.138 He likened the practice of employees 
electing to choose a union through card-check recognition to the 
sham elections held for years in Iraq by Saddam Hussein.139 In 
his own words:
[u]nder Saddam, there was no such thing as secret 
ballots, so of course Saddam won 99 percent of the 
vote in his elections.  With a reputation as a 
ruthless torturer and killer of anyone even remotely 
suspected of opposition, who would dare stand in front 
of his fedayeen henchmen and publicly declare they 
were voting against him?  Yet that is precisely what 
John Sweeney and his henchmen at the AFL-CIO demand of 
American workers.140
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Norwood continued to highlight what is at stake for American 
workers:
[u]nder this scheme, union thugs are allowed to 
confront individual workers on the job and at their 
homes, and demand the worker sign a card giving the 
union exclusive rights to representation. Workers who 
refuse are subject to intimidation, threats and even 
physical violence for not agreeing.141
As a solution, Norwood proposes that Congress amend the National 
Labor Relations Act to forbid an employer from recognizing a 
union unless the union has won majority support from employees 
through a Board certified, “secret ballot” election.142
Sponsors of Norwood’s bill propose inserting language into 
the NLRA mandating that all newly organized private sector 
employees utilize the secret ballot process.143  Specifically, 
the SBPA would amend section 9(a)144 so that a union shall only 
be the exclusive bargaining representative when “designated or 
selected by a secret ballot election conducted by the National 
Labor Relations Board.”145  This language would preclude union 
recognition on the basis of voluntary card check agreements.146
If successful, the SBPA would reverse a long tradition of 
promoting peaceful relations between employers and labor unions 
through employers’ voluntary recognition of labor unions.147
However distasteful and sophomoric Norwood’s analogizing of 
AFL-CIO union organizers to Saddam Hussein’s fedayeen might be, 
flatly dismissing the Secret Ballot Protection Act would be a 
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mistake.  A strong movement of anti-union legislators, 
businesses, and non-profit organizations is waging a concerted 
effort to bring an end to card check recognition.  
Charles Cohen, a former Board member, issued a statement to 
the House Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations on behalf 
of the United States Chamber of Commerce condemning card check 
recognition and supporting the SBPA.148  His statements focused 
on the effectiveness of the NLRB election process, and his 
distaste for card check recognition.149  In terms of the NLRB 
process, Cohen took issue with labor union accusations that 
Board elections are slow and ineffective, citing that in 2003
over 90 percent of representation elections occurred within 56 
days of a union filing the election petition.150 Additionally, 
Cohen points to the fact that unions currently win more then 50 
percent of NLRB elections.151 Though Cohen points legitimately
to the effectiveness of NLRB elections,152 this does not detract 
from unions’ legitimate interest in organizing workers and 
workers interest in being organized.  Card check campaigns have 
a success rate that is 60 percent higher than the NLRB election 
process.153  Fifty-six days and a 50 percent win rate are not 
impressive when compared to an 80 percent win rate with card 
check recognition.  
It is Cohen’s second criticism that resonates more with the 
anti-card check movement.  Cohen claims that voluntary employer 
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recognition and card check campaigns do not focus on organizing 
workers, but instead target employers through “political, 
regulatory, public relations and other forms of non-conventional 
pressure has become known as a ‘corporate campaign.’”154  He 
concludes that “[the] use of corporate campaigns and 
neutrality/card check agreements over the last decade . . . has 
eroded employee free choice and reflects a shift in focus from 
organizing employees to organizing employers.”155 Here, contrary 
to the view of the Supreme Court, Cohen assumes that the 
collection of signed cards is inherently coercive – contrary to 
the free choice of employees and contrary to the free choice of 
employers.156 However, Cohen never reconciles why unions and 
employees file so many unfair labor practice charges in the 
course of Board election campaigns, and yet so few are filed by 
employers and employees in card check campaigns.  
While Cohen’s argument is better reasoned than 
Representative Norwood’s wild claims, like Norwood, he fails to 
explain statistically how this alleged coercion manifests 
itself.  The NLRA indeed protects the free choice of workers.157
But the NLRA does not protect employee free choice by 
exclusively providing a right to vote.158  The NLRA, as 
interpreted for years by the Supreme Court, also allows 
employees to express their choice to organize through means 
other than the NLRB election159 – presumably to insure their 
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right to freely select a bargaining representative.  There is 
ample evidence that in virtually all NLRB elections, management 
commits some act of coercion against its employees.160  But that 
evidence is utterly lacking in terms of demonstrating union 
coercion of employees in non-NLRB elections.  If card check 
campaigns are in fact less coercive than Board elections, as 
statistics demonstrate, then such campaigns serve to better 
honor employees’ desires to organize or not.  If, on the other 
hand, coercion during card check campaigns was as much of a 
threat as advocates of the SBPA have suggested, then the witch 
hunt by groups such as National Right to Work Legal Defense 
would have produced a substantial number of employee suits 
challenging union recognition based on card check.  In the 
absence of such suits or statistics demonstrating systematic 
coercion in card check campaigns, claims of coercion seem 
shallow.
NLRB Regional Director Gerald Kobell dismissed one of the 
few complaints filed alleging union coercion in a card 
campaign.161 Kobell explained that the complaint, filed by 
William Messenger of the National Right to Work Legal Defense
(NRWLD) on behalf of employees of the Metaldyne Corporation,162
was based on “an affidavit from an employee, who is not in the 
bargaining unit, in which she states her belief that other 
employees signed authorization cards because of coercion and/or 
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misrepresentation.”163 Kobell found the complaint so lacking in 
merit as to not warrant trial on the merits.  Though this
dismissal is anecdotal, it perhaps reflects the dearth of 
reasonable grounds for opposition to card check campaigns. 
Employees and employers rarely file complaints with the Board 
claiming coercion, and when such complaints are filed, they are 
often filed with the encouragement of anti-union groups.  While 
that encouragement does not in itself delegitimate the 
complaints, complaints based on belief or conjecture do not 
warrant much merit.
In Playskool, Inc.,164 the NLRB heard a complaint alleging 
employer and union coercion where the employer voluntarily 
recognized the union on the basis of card check recognition.165
The Board did not find that initial recognition of the union was 
the product of coercion, but did find that the union unlawfully 
coerced new employees into joining the union immediately upon 
hire.166  Card check recognition, as used here, was deemed not 
coercive.167  But the fact that the Board analyzed allegations of 
union coercion with respect to several employees, finding 
coercion in certain circumstances and not in others,168
demonstrates the Board’s ability to decide such matters.  
More recently, in Duane Reade, Inc., the Board heard 
allegations of union and employer coercion of employees in a 
card check campaign.169  The Board found that the employer’s 
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assistance to one labor union by “directing employees to a 
meeting . . . for the purpose of signing up with that particular 
Union” constituted coercion where the manager of the plant 
“remained present at the meeting while 17 employees, a majority, 
signed union cards” in support of recognition of that union over 
the petitioner union.170  In Tecumseh Corrugated Box Company, the 
Board heard and analyzed a complaint alleging union and employer 
coercion in a card check campaign and found no coercion.171
The Board hears and decides issues of union coercion 
infrequently, but routinely.  Union coercion is the exception, 
not the rule in card check campaigns.  When coercion occurs, the 
Board is well equipped to detect it and to prevent recognition 
of the union when appropriate.  Since coercion is not rampant 
and the Board is quite able to address coercion when it does 
occur, the threat of coercion should not be grounds for the 
legislature to amend the NLRA to eliminate the most effective
method of organizing employees.
Cohen’s claim regarding union coercion raises issues of 
secondary boycotts in corporate campaigns.172  Cohen claims that 
when unions pressure other members of the community, including 
consumers who frequent other businesses, to support union 
recognition at a particular site, the union engages in secondary 
boycotts.173  NLRA provision § 8(a)(1), creates a right for 
employees to not only organize and bargain collectively, but 
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also to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”174
However, it is an unfair labor practice under NLRA §§ 8(b)(4)(i) 
and (ii) for a union to engage in coercive acts that have a 
secondary purpose of causing third parties to terminate 
relations with a targeted employer.175  But § 8(b)(4)(d) stresses 
that unions and employees retain the right to make public their 
dispute with the employer.176 In construing the NLRA, the 
Supreme Court in Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast 
stated that “more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a 
violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii): that section requires a showing of 
threats, coercion, or restraints.”177 The Court stressed that 
the prohibition should not be given a “broad sweep.”178  The 
Court concluded that the union activity of passing out 
informational hand bills at a targeted shopping mall did not 
rise to an unfair labor practice as it did not have a “coercive 
effect on customers of the mall.”179  The union members merely 
tried to “persuade customers not to shop in the mall.”180
Cohen cites to no cases or theories suggesting that the 
NLRB has found or should find corporate campaigns to be unfair 
labor practices based on a theory of secondary boycotts.  Under 
the current interpretation of section 8 of the NLRA, the NLRB 
could find that such campaigns, under certain circumstances,
rise above the level of persuasion to meet the unfair labor 
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practice level of coercion.  However, the Board is already well 
equipped to make such a determination and does not need the 
Secret Ballot Protection Act to aid it in its judgment.
Over the course of the past decade, relatively few cases 
have been brought before the NLRB alleging union coercion of 
employees in card check campaigns, and fewer findings of 
coercion have been made by the Board.  When these cases have 
come before the Board, the Board has been able to evaluate the 
claims and make decisions accordingly.  This obviates the need 
for legislative interference.  The fact that the Board is 
currently well equipped to deal with allegations of coercion in 
card check campaigns suggests an ulterior motive for advocates 
of the SBPA, which Representative Norwood was rather open about: 
destroying the labor movement all together.181  In fact, 
Representative Norwood rather candidly explained his view of the 
nature of the threat that unions pose to the United States.  In 
his kick off to reintroduce the SBPA, to demonstrate why 
amending the NLRA to prohibit card check was so important, he 
wrote in the Washington Times that the behavior of the AFL-CIO 
in its card check campaigns
is precisely the kind of tyranny that Americans are 
fighting and dying to defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
It is the kind of despotism that we have fought 
against since Bunker Hill. It is a key 21st-century 
justification for why we still need the 2nd 
Amendment.182
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Representative Norwood, likening the AFL-CIO to Saddam Hussein,
Al-Queda, and our former colonizers, insists that the United 
States must defend against the threat posed to this nation by 
organized labor – apparently not only by amending the NLRA, but 
also by arming ourselves.183  Apparently, if the despotic AFL-CIO 
gets too out of control, Americans may be pushed to form a “well 
regulated militia” for the sake of preserving the security of 
our free state.184
B. The Employee Free Choice Act
Democrats, Representative George Miller (California) and 
Senator Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts), have reintroduced the 
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA).185  The EFCA, if passed, would 
amend the NLRA to provide employees the opportunity to file a 
petition with the NLRB alleging majority support for a union.186
Employees could demonstrate this support with signed cards.  The 
Board would then investigate the petition and determine whether 
recognition was appropriate.  If appropriate, the Board would 
not order an election, but would instead certify the union as 
the exclusive representative of the employee unit.187
When initially introducing the EFCA in July 2004, Miller 
said, “[u]nions make good economic sense.  They help workers 
secure better wages, benefits and workplace conditions for 
themselves. Unions also help non-union workers by setting 
standards for other workplaces, bringing broad gains to all 
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workers.”188  He also claimed that, “[a]mid continuing changes in 
the global economy, there is a deeply troubling pattern of 
employers suppressing workers’ organizing rights.  This assault 
on workers’ rights is the leading cause of the decline in union 
membership, which in turn is shrinking the middle class’ share 
of America’s economic growth.”189 Miller’s solution was to 
codify a union’s right to organize outside of the mechanism of 
the certified NLRB election.190  This would fundamentally alter 
card check recognition drives, ending the tradition of voluntary
employer recognition and forcing the employer to recognize a 
union upon NLRB determination that a majority of employees in an 
employee unit expressed support for a union through validly
signed authorization cards.191
The Employee Free Choice Act better promotes the aims of 
the NLRA than the Secret Ballot Protection Act.  The NLRA 
preserves an employee’s right to choose whether or not to 
organize by mandating that if a majority of employees in a unit 
express a desire to organize, their employer must recognize and 
bargain with their chosen representative.192
Without substantial support demonstrating the threat to the 
employee’s right to choose, the SBPA attempts to cut one of two 
viable approaches for employees to choose a labor 
representative.193  At this moment in history, the approach that 
the SBPA would eliminate is the most effective organizing tool 
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employees wishing to organize have at their disposal.  Absent 
evidence of coercion, this effort to limit how employees choose 
a labor representative seems contrary to the spirit of the 
NLRA.194
The Employee Free Choice Act seeks to preserve an 
employee’s right to choose a labor representative outside of the 
NLRB election process.195  The EFCA provides for NLRB oversight 
of this process.196  The Board is experienced in making 
determinations of whether signed cards are valid or not, and 
would have little difficulty in adapting to the new requirements 
imposed by the Employee Free Choice Act.
A possible amendment to the Employee Free Choice Act would 
be to include a slightly higher threshold requirement for 
mandatory employer recognition.  This would likely reduce the 
number of disputes between employers and petitioning unions
while at the same time reduce opposition to the EFCA itself, 
making its passage more likely.  A signed card threshold of 55 
percent, rather than a simple majority, would reduce the 
likelihood of challenges and perhaps allay some fears of 
legislators in considering the legislation.
V. Conclusion
The NLRB should find that the period of time for a 
certification bar in circumstances where an employer recognized 
a union on the basis of card check recognition should be 
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commensurate with that provided when recognition was based on a 
Board election.  Though the Board would be within its statutory 
authority to find that a reasonable period of time for a 
certification bar should be less than that provided in the case 
of a Board election, such a determination would undermine the 
ability of a union to effectively bargain with an employer for 
an initial contract.  That could have the dual effect of 
encouraging an employer to resist bargaining in good faith with 
the union with the hope of undermining the union’s 
certification.  Beyond the issue of the certification bar 
period, the Board should not attempt to aggrandize its power at 
the expense of the legislative branches by either ruling that 
union recognition through card check is not a legitimate 
organizing tool or by rolling back protections for unions 
recognized through card check campaigns.
Congress should reject attempts to amend the NLRA so as to 
prohibit card check recognition.  This would limit the original 
intent of the NLRA to preserve peaceful industrial relations and 
protect an employee’s right to choose whether or not to form a 
labor organization.  This would also have a devastating impact 
on the labor movement in the United States.  Rather, Congress 
should adopt the Employee Free Choice Act to ensure employees 
are able to organize when they are able to gain majority 
support. Supporters of the Employee Free Choice Act should 
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consider amending the proposed legislation to require a 
threshold greater than a simple majority – perhaps 55 percent –
so as to reduce resistance to the legislation and to reduce the 
number of challenges to majority status after Congress passes 
the legislation.
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